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(D.C. No. 3-15-cr-00189-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
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Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, PHIPPS and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 









* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
In District Court, Rhashean Strange pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute at least one kilogram of heroin, and he received a 
sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment.  Strange appealed that judgment and sentence, 
but his court-appointed counsel filed an Anders motion to withdraw representation on the 
grounds that Strange has no non-frivolous issue to appeal.  See Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  Through its own brief, the Government 
supports the Anders motion.  Strange has not filed a pro se brief in support of his appeal.   
Based on those filings and our independent review, we will grant counsel’s motion 
to withdraw, and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 In June 2014, the FBI and Pennsylvania State Police began investigating Strange 
and his co-conspirators on suspicion of heroin trafficking.  Over the next few months, 
confidential informants made several controlled purchases of heroin from Strange.  
Various cooperating witnesses testified about Strange’s heroin-dealing activities.  And 
law-enforcement searches of Strange’s residence and car, as well as two co-conspirators’ 
residences, yielded additional contraband, including heroin, marijuana, handguns, 
ammunition, packaging material, money, and cellphones.  A federal grand jury returned a 
27-count indictment against Strange and seven co-conspirators, including six counts 
against Strange himself – five related to drugs and one related to firearms, plus a criminal 
forfeiture allegation.   
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 Strange pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute more than one 
kilogram of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  In anticipation of sentencing, the 
Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), which calculated a 
total offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of III.  Based on those figures, 
the Guidelines range for Strange’s sentence was 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment.  The 
PSR did not identify any factors warranting either a departure from the Guidelines or a 
variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).   
Through his court-appointed counsel, Strange sought a downward variance for two 
reasons.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  First, he argued that his sentence should be lower than 
the Guidelines range because the four-level enhancement he received for being an 
organizer or leader of a criminal enterprise effectively double-counted the quantity of 
drugs he possessed.  Second, Strange compared his sentence with that of his partner in 
the drug business, who had a more significant criminal history and also possessed a 
firearm in connection with the offense, but received a much lower sentence – 121 
months.  Strange viewed that 47-month disparity between his partner’s sentence and the 
low-end of his own Guidelines-range sentence as cause for a variance.  The Government 
opposed those arguments and defended the appropriateness of the Guidelines range, 
particularly in light of the opioid crisis both nationwide and in Pennsylvania.  The 
District Court declined to vary downward and sentenced Strange to a bottom-of-the-
Guidelines term of 168 months’ imprisonment.   
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After that final judgment, Strange filed a notice of appeal through counsel, 
triggering the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Counsel then filed an Anders motion to withdraw, contending that 
review of the case yielded no non-frivolous appellate issues.  In response, the 
Government agreed.  Strange did not file a pro se brief in support of his appeal. 
II. 
Counsel for a criminal defendant is generally expected to continue that 
representation on appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.1; see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  
But when counsel believes that no non-frivolous basis for the appeal exists, he or she may 
file an Anders motion for court approval to withdraw representation.  See Anders, 
386 U.S. at 744; see, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 264 (2000); McCoy v. Ct. of 
Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 430 (1988).  To obtain such approval, counsel 
must first “satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search of 
appealable issues,” United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000), and 
second persuade the court that any appellate issue would be “so frivolous that it may be 
decided without an adversary presentation,” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82 (1988).  If 
after reviewing counsel’s motion, the Government’s response, and any pro se filings, 
along with its own independent review of the record, the court determines that those two 
criteria are met, then the court “will grant counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the 
appeal without appointing new counsel.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a); see also United States 




In his Anders brief, Strange’s counsel identifies three potential categories of 
appellate issues.  They relate to the District Court’s jurisdiction, the voluntariness of 
Strange’s guilty plea, and the validity of Strange’s sentence.  In response, the 
Government agrees with counsel’s assessment of the scope of potential appellate issues.  
On independent review, counsel’s Anders brief demonstrates a thorough examination of 
the record, reflecting the requisite diligence to guide this Court’s assessment.  See Youla, 
241 F.3d at 301.  For the reasons below, this appeal contains no nonfrivolous issues. 
First, there is no jurisdictional defect.  Because Strange was charged with several 
federal criminal offenses that primarily occurred within the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.   
Second, there is no infirmity with Strange’s guilty plea.  The District Court 
properly ensured that Strange’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  See 
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240–
42 (1969); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).   
Third, there is no nonfrivolous basis for Strange to challenge his bottom-of-the-
Guidelines sentence.  The sentence was below the statutory maximum of life 
imprisonment.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  Nor was the Guidelines-range calculation 
erroneous.  A within-range sentence carries a presumption of reasonableness, see Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007), and the record here does not suggest that the 
District Court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence within that range, see United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Thus, the within-Guidelines 
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sentence was both substantively and procedurally reasonable.  See United States v. 
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 213–16 (3d Cir. 2010).   
* * * 
For these reasons, we will grant counsel’s Anders motion to withdraw and affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  
